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The document by Greco, Padoa-Schioppa and Silvestri is a very topical and
interesting attempt to define a bipartisan consensus on European issues. It
can be looked at through Italian and European lenses. 
From an Italian perspective, it can be regarded as a skillful initiative to get
the major political groupings to accept that there is common ground on
Europe so as to maintain a continuous and credible foreign policy. 
But it is also relevant from a European perspective: the UK, France, the
Netherlands and Poland are all countries where Europe is not consensual.
The same question continues to come up there and elsewhere: is there a
reasonable common ground on Europe? Can there be, should there be a
￿Brussels consensus￿ (to use a variant of John Williamson￿s ￿Washington
consensus￿)? An attempt will be made here to examine the problem from
this angle. 
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Constitutional vs. partisan politics
The document in fact attempts to draw a border between constitutional
politics ￿ on which consensus is expected ￿ and partisan politics ￿ on which
reasonable people may disagree. This is not an easy task, as illustrated last
year in the debate during the referenda on the draft constitution. People in
France actually disagreed on the basics: a unifying theme of the ￿no￿ camp ￿
to which the ￿yes￿ camp was not really able to respond convincingly ￿ was
that the referendum was about constitutionalising matters which belong to
the realm of partisan politics. While participants in the Convention on the
Future of Europe thought they had reached a reasonable consensus, the
victory of the no in fact indicated that there was disagreement on the very
principle of claiming that some choices were beyond dispute.
In France as elsewhere in Europe, there is evident dissatisfaction about
the state of the European Union. There can be various interpretations of it,
but polls strongly suggest that this dissatisfaction stems mostly from the
state of the economy. People rightly regard European integration as an
endeavour that is meant to deliver prosperity, a major European public
good. However, they do not see the prosperity and hence are dissatisfied. 
The question is therefore not whether people are satisfied or not. It is
whether they are dissatisfied with European integration in general or with
the specific policies adopted, which are partly the responsibility of the EU
and partly the responsibility of member states. And therefore, whether it is
possible for them to express dissatisfaction with the way the EU is run
without questioning the EU itself. The greater the scope for disagreement
on how the EU is run, the more consensus there can be on the essentials of
European integration.
Drawing the border between constitutional and partisan politics is thus
important not only because it highlights what you agree on, but also
because it establishes what you can disagree on. Bertold Brecht once told the
Communist Party of the former German Democratic Republic that it should
draw up a list of questions to which there is no answer because the party was
always pretending to have an answer to everything. In the same manner,
what I suggest is to draw up a list of the issues on which there can be
disagreement among dedicated Europeans. 
European partisan politics?
Is there, however, something like partisan European politics? The
widespread perception is that it hardly exists because at the end of the day,
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But recent research by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and GØrard Roland sheds
a different light on the issue.1 They have studied all votes in the European
Parliament over the last 25 years and found that there is increasing partisanship
within the institution, that is, that the members of the European Parliament
vote less and less along national lines and more and more along partisan lines.
This is not to say that national views do not matter. But the trend is unmis-
takeable: there is increasingly a European debate in which there are disagree-
ments between the right and the left on a certain set of European issues.
This is good news because it is an indication that you can be in favour of
the EU system and at the same time disagree on specific policies, as in any
country where you can accept the constitution but disagree on policies. The
problem is that citizens hardly perceive this trend. Links between MEPs and
the electorate are weak. Electoral campaigns for the EP are fought along
different lines in different countries and issues that are divisive within the EP
are not perceived at the national level. 
The matter also has to be taken one step further to see what room there is
for partisan politics on the main European economic policies. A simple way
to investigate this is to use the intellectual structure of the report written
almost 20 years ago by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa called ￿Efficiency, stabili-
ty and equity￿.2 It breaks economic policy down into three basic elements,
the three pillars of the economic policy debate: allocation policies, which
have to do with efficiency; macroeconomic policies, which have to do with
stabilisation, and redistribution policies, which have to do with equity.
Political parties within EU countries have different views on what is desirable
as regards efficiency, stability and equity. Do those disagreements have a
European dimension? Do they trigger a European debate? 
Efficiency
On efficiency, my short answer is: increasingly. There are different views in
the European Parliament on the extent of public regulation, harmonisation
vs. competition on regulatory or tax matters, corporate governance, the role
of industrial policy, etc. This has been illustrated in a number of recent
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debates, not only over the services directive, but also over the Reach
directive and the takeover directive. In all these issues there are different
views that distinguish the right from the left. 
This dimension of the left-wing debate was overshadowed in the 1980s
and the 1990s by the dispute between integrationists and partisans of
national sovereignty. Throughout the history of the EU, and especially since
the launch of the Single Market, integration has been closely associated
with liberalisation. Opposition to liberalisation thus went along with
opposition to integration. 
But those times are over. Except in specific sectors like utilities, the de
facto alliance around the Single Market between Jacques Delors the
integrationist and Margaret Thatcher the liberaliser has dissolved. As
integration has matured, there is increasingly a debate on the structure and
regulation of European markets. There is thus room for disagreement
between left and right. From this perspective, the controversy on economic
￿patriotism￿ or ￿nationalism￿ that emerged in early 2006 is very dangerous.
The risk is that it will once again overshadow the discussion on how the EU
should be run and lead back to paleolithic discussions on the exclusive role
of the nation state in the protection of national economic interests. 
Stability
On stability, the answer is: potentially. Within a framework where there is
agreement on the need to preserve price stability and fiscal sustainability,
there is also scope for disagreement on the degree of activism of both
monetary and fiscal policy. To take just one example: the British monetary
framework is different from that of the euro zone, yet it is also compatible
with price stability and fiscal sustainability. So you can have different
frameworks that meet certain requirements and at same time endorse
different views on macroeconomic policy. 
The problem here, however, is that there is still too little debate on these
issues, in part because monetary issues are beyond the reach of politics and
in the hands of the European Central Bank, which prefers to avoid being
challenged on its priorities and strategy, and also because fiscal policy is
very much restricted to the national framework. So potentially there is scope
for debate, but it has not yet been realised at the EU level.
Making room for a macroeconomic debate should be a priority for the
EU. The discussion on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact was a
first example of what can be discussed and must be regarded as a positive
development. More should follow and whatever one￿s view on the issues at
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Equity
Finally, on equity, the short answer is: to a very limited extent. The
difficulty is one of competence, so it is a serious one. The European Union
has responsibility for redistribution between countries or regions, but none
for redistribution among persons. Thus the debate on the equity dimensions
of reform, which is a major topic for controversy in some European
countries, does not take place to the same extent in Europe. The result is
that the people who care the most about equity ￿ and about alleviating the
pains of those adversely affected by economic liberalisation and
globalisation ￿ do not find an answer at the EU level. This is a potentially
dangerous threat to the legitimacy of the EU because people do care about
equity. An EU that has nothing to say about it could easily turn into a
scapegoat. 
In this respect, the proposals put forward by Commission President
Barroso for a globalisation fund are useful. The very fact that they have been
put forward is an indication that he is aware of the issue and in search of
political responses. There are, obviously, many technical problems involved
in the operation of such a fund, but it is nevertheless a clear attempt to
introduce the interpersonal equity dimension in the European Union toolkit.
In fact the debate this proposal has triggered already encompasses familiar
themes in the left-right debate, such as the trade-off between assistance and
moral hazard. 
Conclusion
It is important to know what you can agree on, but equally important to
know what you can disagree on. The upshot of the analysis made here is
that there is some, but still not enough scope for political disagreement
among those who favour European integration. This is unsafe for Europe and
one of the best ways to develop ownership in the EU among citizens is to
engage in sound debates on the way it is run. 